Libya, the Obama doctrine

Obama's statement to the nation about actions in Libya are closely consistent with the overall Obama doctrine: it follows from a stance of multilateralism, is based on consultation, seeks to answer the call of a threatened people, and promises no American troops will be deployed on the ground. These seem like the right moves for now, though since the post on March 21, 2011, some have criticized Obama's actions.

Gaddafi has long been antagonistic to the U.S., but following 9/11 he appeared to realize that Islamist terrorists were as much a threat to him as they were to the secular governments of the West. What he must not have fathomed is how the U.S. will cooperate with someone of his ilk but turn quickly if a democratic tide pushes against him. This was the lesson from Mubarak, and it may yet be the case throughout the middle east and north Africa. The most interesting test case of American principles is Saudi Arabia. Will we continue to support its liberal monarchy for fear of its intolerant citizenry? Or will we allow a rising tide of democracy to push the monarchs aside, should it come to that? It is likely that they have grave misgivings about liberal Obama and wish for a return to the Evangelical Bush.

Woodrow Wilson
image: Wikimedia

Though it was but a few years ago, it seems a distant past when issues of this sort predominated in our relationship with China. Though we traded with them heavily, we insisted on making vocal claims about human rights violations. We have gone from being a major trading partner to being a major borrower, and the Chinese government seems more focused on economic growth than on political control. But what would our position be should there be a 'demonstration' followed by a 'crack down'? Of course, much would depend on the actual circumstances: some crack downs could be so grievous that we would need to say something, and some demonstrations could fail to gain our sympathy. But the deeper issue, as it is for Saudi Arabia, is independence of moral standing. Arguably, in both cases, our moral standing is compromised (or at least shaped) by our interests.

The realist position, the dominant U.S. approach to international relations, argues that interests must guide our work with and confrontation of other nations. Moral positions, the realists claim, are simply tools for advancing our interests. But the U.S. also has a strong sense of universalist mission, which is grounded in the common culture (various forms of Christianity) and is articulated in terms of liberal internationalism.

Arguably the Bush administration was as much guided by liberal internationalist views (of the President himself) as it was by hawkish neo-conservatives. In these dangerous times, let us hope that our actions afield are considered from many perspectives. This moment is pregnant with judgment. Much is at stake, and much could go wrong.

Obama, On Military Action in Libya

Check out the text of Obama's statement in military action in Libya. RITN will comment in the next day or two.

History's Curveballs

The upsurge of protest and rising tide of democratic revolution in north Africa and throughout the middle east reminds one of predictions made by neoconservatives in advance of the Iraq war. We would be greeted as liberators, and democracy would sweep the region, they said.

Image courtesy of Silver Spoon
by way of Wikimedia Commons.

In the early going, we were greeted by a few as liberators, but the nastiness of war eventually led many to conclude we were in fact enemies. About the transformation to democracy, a claim scorned by many (including me), history may have thrown one of its classic curveballs. The curveball is history’s answer to Hegel and Marx’s dialectic, which retains the linear and progressive features of liberalism, Christianity, and Judaism. History lurches, really quite haphazardly at points, and cannot be mapped out in advance.

The neoconservatives argued that there was an immense feeling of repression and suppression in the middle east—and larger Arab world. Toppling one sadistic potentate would destabilize every tyrant. The neocons, with their faith in humanity’s desire for freedom, apparently were right about that. Regardless antique traditions of servitude and cultures of submission, people want to be free, to choose their government officials, and to give shape to the political structure of their society. Repression is not made more palatable by government buy-outs and pay-offs.

The neoconservatives did not fathom the power of something such as Wikileaks. Nor did anyone else. The leaks showed abuses of power within these states to the world as a whole. The open secrets were now more open than secret; there was no denying mendacity and abuse. The political destabilization of the middle east—the toppling and execution of Hussein—may have been a necessary condition to broad-based revolution, but it was not sufficient.

Nor is history done throwing curveballs. The classic realist position would never have authorized destabilizing the region. Who knows what’s next? Will quasi-democratic revolutions lead to anarchy? Destruction? The toppling of Saudi Arabia? Will we see thousand dollar barrels of oil? Frankly, no one knows. According to some theologies, even God is unsure.

So back to the neoconservatives (and others, such as classic liberals, who share faith in humanity’s desire to be free): freedom is a right, but it is not a guarantee that all will be well. Freeing people may lead to anarchy, especially if structures to organize freedom are underdeveloped. More importantly, we do not know how newly won freedoms will interact with other elements of culture, structure, and process. The dominant post-Cold War paradigm, which was the Cold War paradigm, only with the US solely at the helm, is shifting.

The world is becoming something, but we are not yet sure what it will become. In some ways, these shifts might be as dramatic and destructive as the seismic shifts that have laid waste to Japan. Let us hope that is not so.