Whorf argued that the metaphysical implications of languages ‘picture reality’ and thus fundamentally determine how people experience the world. If your language has no future tense, Whorf argued, your sense of futurity is undeveloped or non-existent. Whorf’s bolder claims fell to the scrutiny of common sense and empirical examination, Deutscher reports. A language that contains no past tense does not prevent its speaker from thinking about the past, only from referring to it in language. Native hearers know the difference and can use locutions to communicate. The ancient Hebrew language lacks words to communicate comparative preference, and thus God 'loves' Jacob and 'hates' Esau. That is, he loves Jacob more. Still troubling, in some respects, but less so than God hating Esau.
Deutscher’s article explores linguist Roman Jakobson claim that “languages differs essentially in what ... [their speakers] must convey” to show that Whorf was onto something. A French speaker must reveal the gender of a companion to refer to him or her, whereas an English speaker does not. Speakers of the Guugu Yimithirr language have no equivalents for words to indicate spatial directions such as left, right, and behind. They still have to communicate about where things are and hence use cardinal compass points to refer to the location of objects. “Honey, where’s my sweater?” one might ask. “On the east side of the table, just south of the pile of books you left their last night, sweetheart,” could be the reply.
The late historical theologian George Lindbeck (of Yale Divinity School) referred to the “cultural linguistic” approach to religion. Lindbeck’s view, set forth in a 1984 volume entitled The Nature of Doctrine, is that religious experiences are secondary to doctrinal grammars, to cultural-linguistic codings. ‘Nirvana’ and the ‘Triune God’ are not the same thing and are not various ways of referring to an underlying common experience. Lindbeck’s approach takes differences among religions more seriously than experience-oriented liberals generally do. A similar line of thought is pursued in Stephen Prothero’s God is not One.
The work at RITN seems to vindicate the notion that religious languages fundamentally shape experience. That is, religious languages construe the world’s significance, tell us what to value, how to act, what sorts of consciousness are valuable, and the like. As such, religious languages contain the world. (One can consistently maintain that intense experiences lead to ‘doctrinal’ development. The point is that all future ‘re-experiences’ will be conditioned by, and indeed called forth, by doctrinal or cultural-linguistic precursors.)
The question, for deliberation in another evening’s blog post, is what to think about religion in the news if religious languages and their grammar’s fundamentally shape experience. Are translations possible? Are religious discourses essentially incommensurate? Are their bridge points between the various ‘language games’ that constitute the world religiously?
Let's prepare for this thinking by considering Friedrich Nietzsche's claim that
In its origin language belongs to the age of the most rudimentary psychology. We enter a realm of crude fetishism when we summon before consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language — in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason. Everywhere reason sees a doer and doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things — only thereby does it first create the concept of "thing."...
"Reason" in language — oh, what an old deceptive female she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar (Twilight of Idols, "Reason" in Philosophy, 5).

